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here is, at least in large principle, freedom of information in the 
United States, a presumption that government and its functions will 
be and should be open to the public. This means that many 
government documents ranging from budgets to extraterrestrial life 
investigations to arrestees’ mugshots are available to anyone who makes a 
request for them. The idea is that robust openness gives citizens the ability to 
learn exactly what government players are doing and, as the documents may 
sometimes reveal, why. 
There are groups with interests that compete with such openness, however, 
including those professors and researchers whose salaries are paid by the 
government. These scholars work in public colleges and universities; they are, 
therefore, public employees and subject to freedom-of-information laws.  
This essay focuses on public information within the academy – and the effect 
that such openness has on academics’ First Amendment-based academic 
freedom. Academic freedom gives many of them rights within reasonable limits 
to research what they want, to learn what they want, and to teach as they choose. 
In that way, these government players have a constitutional layer of privacy-
related protection for their educational interests that seemingly competes with a 
presumption of openness. 
Given the strongly ideological interests behind many requests for academic 
information, and given the tempering effect on academic expression excessively 
open access could have, the essay focuses on the threat to academia when states 
or government or courts are too willing to expose certain academic information. 
It argues that information privacy law and related Supreme Court concerns 
about thought investigation could well help shift judicial perception back toward 
the importance of academic freedom. 
INTRODUCTION 
In 2014, a group that once called itself the American Traditions 
Institute made a public records request of two professors at the 
University of Arizona. ATI, now known as the Energy & 
Environmental Legal Institute, wanted certain emails that existed 
or once existed in the inboxes and outboxes of these two 
professors. These emails, of course, necessarily included those sent 
by and to other researchers at other universities. In all, e-mails to 
and from twelve individual scholars were reported to be at issue.  
ATI describes itself as an organization that “holds accountable 
those who seek excessive and destructive government regulation 
based on agenda-driven policy making, junk science, and hysteria.”1 
                                                
1 http://eelegal.org/?page_id=1657 (last visited March 2015). 
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It appears particularly interested in climate change; Scientific 
American described the organization as one “known for its attempts 
to discredit climate science.”2  
E & E Legal itself suggests that it furthers its work by making 
public record requests of public universities and other institutions 
that do scientific research. State open records laws, the 
organization has written, were “intended to give the public access 
to records created by public servants, including those working for 
universities.”3  
Those “public servants,” at least in the organization’s mind, include 
public university professors, and extends to the professors’ emails. 
A 2014 E & E Legal freedom-of-information request, for example, 
asked for various documents from University of Illinois professor 
Donald Weubbles, a chaired atmospheric scientist. That request 
included his email communication: 
Please provide us copies of any correspondence, including 
attachments, sent to or from Dr. Weubbles, including as To, 
From, cc:, and/or bcc:, that are on a University of Illinois system 
or system used by the University, which 
(A) is to or from (including as To, From, cc:, and/or bcc:) 
anyone with Union of Concerned Scientists, 
(B) mentions Union of Concerned Scientists, and/or 
(C) cite or pertain to the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC), and/or its parent organizations 
UNFCCC and/or the “World Meteorological 
Association”; these records include but are not limited to 
those citing not the IPCC expressly but its product “AR5” 
or 5th (or Fifth) Assessment Report. 
[D]ocuments responsive to this request will have been 
created, dated, sent or received by Dr. Wuebbles between 
April 1, 2009 and the date the University performs the 
relevant, respective search(es) in response to this request, 
inclusive.4 
In early 2015, both the Arizona and the Illinois requests remained 
at least in part unresolved as universities struggled with their 
professors’ right to academic freedom and that right’s apparent 
conflict with open records laws. The University of Illinois 
responded in part that the E & E request was too burdensome, a 
legitimate response under most FOIA laws, but also one decidedly 
not protective of the information more generally. 
Meantime, E & E Legal promised a continuing effort to demand 
similar materials from professors across the United States. By one 
count, six other schools had received similar requests for 
information. In 2015, E & E Legal’s website suggested that it 
                                                
2 Stephanie Paige Ogburn, “How to Cope When Activitists Ask for Climate Scientists’ 
Personal E-Mails,” Scientific American, January 21, 2014. 
3 http://eelegal.org/?p=3221 (last visited March 2015). 
4 http://eelegal.org/?page_id=1493 (last visited March 2015). 
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would “keep peppering universities around the country with similar 
requests under state open records laws.”5  
E & E Legal, with its particular interest in climate change research, 
is not alone in public document requests from professors and 
researchers. In 2014, a gay rights advocacy group requested emails 
from a University of Virginia law professor; the group wished to 
investigate any connections he had with anti-gay groups.6 Also in 
2014, a professor who had been promised a job at the University 
of Illinois (withdrawn after his inflammatory anti-Israel tweets 
became public) made a freedom-of-information request from the 
university for certain emails regarding his appointment; the 
appointment was a contentious one that involved faculty members 
and administrators from multiple departments.7 And in Kansas in 
2015, public records requests were made of a lecturer at the 
University of Kansas who was said to have received some funding 
from the Koch brothers, billionaire conservatives.8 
In response to such requests, the University of California at Los 
Angeles, for one, enacted campus policies to protect what it called 
the academic freedom of its researchers. “[F]aculty scholarly 
communications must be protected from [freedom-of-
information] requests,” the policy at UCLA reads, “to guard the 
principle of academic freedom, the integrity of the research process 
and peer review, and the broader teaching and research mission of 
the university.”9 
What such language does best, however, is highlight the tension 
between open records acts and the academic freedom that many 
within higher education believe should protect them and give them 
the right to research and discuss their research with others without 
outside interests potentially weighing every word. 
This essay highlights the conflict between openness and academic 
freedom. It proceeds in three main parts: first, it explores freedom-
of-information statutes and the presumption of openness in 
government in the United States; second, it examines the concept 
of academic freedom and the First Amendment-based ideal that 
scholars must have the freedom to explore ideas and research lest 
the search for truth be impeded; finally, it explores the clash 
between the competing interests and argues that academic freedom 
interests should trump public records and openness-in-
government interests when the scholarly work of professors is at 
issue. It does so by referring to privacy law and the Supreme 
Court’s increasing recognition of privacy’s relationship to freedom 
of expression.  
                                                
5 E & E website (last visited March 2015).  
6 Colleen Flaherty, “Transparency versus Censorship,” Inside Higher Ed, May 29, 2014. 
7 Julie Wurth, “Judge rejects UI’s attempt to dismiss Salaita FOIA suit,” News-Gazette, 
February 13, 2015.  
8 Kaitlin Mulhere, “Open records and academic freedom come to a head in Kansas,” 
Inside Higher Ed, January 14, 2015. 
9 Colleen Flaherty, “Protecting Faculty Records,” Inside Higher Ed, January 14, 2014. 
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§ 1 – FREEDOM-OF-INFORMATION STATUTES 
The federal government and all states in the United States have 
statutes that mandate that government records be open to citizens 
who seek them. The goal of these statutes is to keep government 
open and honest. As one of many examples, the State of Illinois 
Freedom of Information Act captures nicely the prevailing ideal of 
utter openness. It suggests that public documents, including the 
work of individual government actors, are open to ensure that 
public work is being done in the public interest. Consider the 
impact of the following language on scholars who work for public 
universities:  
Pursuant to the fundamental philosophy of the American 
constitutional form of government, it is declared to be the 
public policy of the State of Illinois that all persons are 
entitled to full and complete information regarding the 
affairs of government and the official acts and policies of 
those who represent them as public officials and public 
employees consistent with the terms of this Act. Such 
access is necessary to enable the people to fulfill their duties 
of discussing public issues fully and freely, making 
informed political judgments and monitoring government 
to ensure that it is being conducted in the public interest. 
The General Assembly hereby declares that it is the public 
policy of the State of Illinois that access by all persons to 
public records promotes the transparency and 
accountability of public bodies at all levels of government. 
It is a fundamental obligation of government to operate 
openly and provide public records as expediently and 
efficiently as possible in compliance with this Act.10 
Under the Illinois Act, therefore, “[a]ll records in the custody or 
possession of a public body [including a public university] are 
presumed to be open to inspection or copying.”11 The information 
that is available to members of the public if they ask is defined 
expansively: “all records, reports, forms, writings, letters, 
memoranda, books, papers, maps, photographs, microfilms, cards, 
tapes, recordings, electronic data processing records, electronic 
communications, recorded information and all other documentary 
materials pertaining to the transaction of public business, 
regardless of physical form or characteristics, having been prepared 
by or for, or having been or being used by, received by, in the 
possession of, or under the control of any public body.”12 Consider 
how relevant such a definition is to scholars: records, reports, 
letters, memoranda, books, papers, and electronic communications 
are all open to the public. 
                                                
10 5 ILCS 140/1 (2010). 
11 5 ILCS 140/1.2 (2010). 
12 5 ILCS 140/2 (2010). 
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Other states have similarly expansive language or, at the very least, 
similarly expansive procedures regarding public documents. The 
federal government also opens its records with the exception of 
nine fairly discrete (and admittedly subject-to-interpretation areas), 
including those records that would impact national security, certain 
law enforcement records, and records containing trade secrets.13 
Privacy by name is mentioned only in the context of medical and 
personnel files in the federal FOIA statute. Those, and “similar 
files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted 
invasion of personal privacy” are exempt under the Act.14 There is 
no explicit exception for emails or similar communications sent by 
federal employees. 
Given the ideal of openness, and the expansive definition of the 
term “records,” the American Association of University Professors 
has warned that public records requests could extend far beyond 
email in some states, and could include the “titles of books [that 
professors] request from the library, peer-review comments they 
offer and solicit, and tentative ideas they share with colleagues.”15 
Though not yet clear, even communication with students or about 
students may be subject to disclosure despite seemingly protective 
educational privacy laws for those who study at colleges and 
universities in the United States.16 
Some state-affiliated academics have started to use Gmail and 
other non-university-based email accounts in order to try to avoid 
record requests; some forward their state emails to a non-state-
sponsored email account automatically, for example. But that 
practice too has come under scrutiny, as presumed U.S. presidential 
candidate and former U.S. Secretary of State Hilary Clinton found 
out in early 2015 when Congress announced an investigation into 
her alleged policy of using a private account for government 
business. Moreover, there is some push to change open-records 
laws to reflect such a practice, including the specific addition to 
FOIA language that business done on personal devices must be 
made available.17 One related statutory change was sparked by a 
request for messages “sent from a private Gmail account using the 
person’s own smart phone or other electronic device.”18  
As the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, an 
organization strongly supportive of openness in government, has 
suggested, “[a]s with all public employees, records of public 
university professors are generally subject to disclosure.”19 One 
                                                
13 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2009). 
14 Id.  
15 American Association of University Professors, “Academic Freedom and Electronic 
Communications,” November 2013. 
16 Doug Lederman, “Federal Judge Limits Use of FERPA,” Inside Higher Ed, March 10, 
2011.  
17 “Council Policy on 0-33 On Public Records and Communications to Council on Non-
City Devices,” City of San Jose Memorandum dated November 26, 2012. 
18 City of San Jose v. Superior Court of Santa Clara County, 2014 WL 1254821 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2014). 
19 You-Jin Han, “Academic Freedom and the Public’s Right to Know,” The News Media 
and the Law, Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, Fall 2011. 
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journalism dean at a public university maintains that this type of 
scrutiny necessarily comes with any political work in controversial 
areas like climate change and labor law, and contends that 
professors who research in those areas and others like them should 
be aware that their work will be made accessible to the public in a 
very real way.20  
§ 2 – ACADEMIC FREEDOM 
It is necessary to evaluate openness and freedom of information 
against the principle of academic freedom, a First Amendment-
based right first accepted by the United States Supreme Court more 
than sixty years ago. 
In 1954, an avowed Marxist refused to reveal to state investigators 
what he had said to a class of college students at the University of 
New Hampshire. The investigators, worried about the spread of 
Marxism and Communism ideologies within public institutions, 
wished to find out what the state’s young people had been taught. 
Those investigators initially won when a state court found the 
lecturer in contempt for refusing to reveal exactly what he had said 
to the students.  
The lecturer’s claimed right to keep quiet eventually reached the 
United States Supreme Court and the resulting opinion included 
the Court’s first use of the phrase “academic freedom.” In language 
poetically supportive of what goes on inside a college or university, 
a plurality of the Justices endorsed academic scholarship and “the 
essentiality of freedom in the community of American 
universities”: 
No one should underestimate the vital role in a democracy 
that is played by those who guide and train our youth. To 
impose any strait jacket upon the intellectual leaders in our 
colleges and universities would imperil the future of our 
Nation … Scholarship cannot flourish in an atmosphere of 
suspicion and distrust. Teachers and students must always 
remain free to inquire, to study and to evaluate, to gain new 
maturity and understanding; otherwise our civilization will 
stagnate and die.21 
Ten years later, when New York state employees including public 
university instructors were forced to assure the state that they were 
not communists, the Justices grounded academic freedom more 
firmly in the First Amendment. Once again, they wrote strongly 
about the importance of academic freedom to all of society: 
Our Nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic 
freedom, which is of transcendent value to all of us and not 
merely to the teachers concerned. That freedom is 
therefore a special concern of the First Amendment, which 
does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the 
                                                
20 Id.  
21 Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957). 
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classroom … The classroom is peculiarly the “marketplace 
of ideas.” The Nation’s future depends upon leaders 
trained through wide exposure to that robust exchange of 
ideas which discovers truth “out of a multitude of tongues, 
[rather] than through any kind of authoritative selection.”22 
As firmly supportive of academic freedom as that language may be, 
it has not, however, protected academics when outsiders have 
sought information regarding academic research and academic 
thought. Early cases that involved a clash between freedom of 
information and academic freedom arose in the highest courts of 
Ohio and New York. In both, the courts sided with openness in 
government. 
In Ohio in 1994, the court ordered Ohio State University to release 
the names and work addresses of its animal research scientists.23 
The state’s open records law was “construed liberally in favor of 
broad access,” the court reasoned, and “any doubt must be 
resolved in favor of disclosure of public records.” It saw a parallel 
in a case in which university tenure reviewers’ names were released 
to a requester over protests from the institution. Likewise, the 
court reasoned, the names and work addresses of researchers 
simply “serve[d] to document the organization, functions, and 
operations of [the university’s] animal research activities” even 
though the court recognized that the lives of the researchers would 
be put in danger upon release of the information. 
As for academic freedom concerns, the court was unimpressed, 
discounting worries that research might be stifled if scientists, 
worried about their personal safety, would hesitate to do certain 
types of research. The judges compared the dangers of the release 
of names in a tenure file with that of the release of animal 
researchers’ identities, noting that there was some concern that 
reviewers would temper their reviews just as there was some 
concern that animal research scientists would temper their 
research. The judges suggested that, despite those concerns, 
presumed openness of public access, in effect, trumped academic 
freedom.  
New York’s highest court was similarly unswayed in a case 
involving professors and what was taught within a classroom. 
There, the justices ordered that a class’s film and filmstrips be open 
to public scrutiny through the state’s freedom-of-information law. 
The college course at issue focused on family life and sexuality, and 
the court rejected the idea that such information was similar to the 
deliberative process materials that were protected from disclosure 
under the statute. Because the people have a “right to know the 
process of government decision-making and to review the 
documents and statistics leading up to it” without “the cloak of 
secrecy or confidentiality,” the court decided that they also had a 
                                                
22 Keyishian v. Board of Regents of the University of the State of New York, 385 U.S. 589 (1967). 
23 Thomas v. Ohio State University, 643 N.E.2d 126 (Ohio 1994). 
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right to know about educational materials that instructors had used 
in a college classroom. 
Given those outcomes regarding research and classroom records, 
it is not surprising that a more generalized scholar’s privilege – one 
in which a professor is not called upon to testify in court and/or is 
not forced to reveal documents despite requests by the state or by 
a party to a lawsuit – has not been generally embraced by courts. 
Therefore, as a part of the discovery process, scholars at both 
public and private schools have been forced to turn over field notes 
and raw data on rollover accidents, smoking, sociology-related 
trends in restaurants, and more – despite having no involvement 
whatsoever in the underlying claim as plaintiff or defendant.24 
§ 3 – THE CLASH BETWEEN OPENNESS AND ACADEMIC 
FREEDOM TODAY 
In January 2014, Scientific American, one of the leading science 
publications in the United States, published an article titled “How 
to Cope When Activists Ask for Climate Scientists’ Personal E-
Mails.”25 The article reported that a legal defense fund had been 
created to offer guidance to professors and others at public 
universities who had received freedom-of-information requests for 
emails or other research-related materials. It quoted a senior fellow 
at E & E Legal who suggested that such public record requests 
were appropriate. The records sought, he explained, involved 
individuals who are paid with public money and yet who have 
practiced what he called advocacy.  
Meantime, the American Constitution Society for Law and Policy, 
a liberal legal organization, published its own Issue Brief as 
guidance for scholars, and referred back to key Supreme Court 
academic freedom cases in warning that FOIA could be misused 
to chill research: “[M]aking every scholarly exchange vulnerable to 
a FOIA request in the name of public disclosure,” it wrote, “could 
… foster an ‘atmosphere of suspicion and distrust’ and stifle the 
‘marketplace of ideas’ that enables public universities to make 
invaluable contributions to the development of knowledge and to 
society.”26  
The Issue Brief suggested four different reasons why courts might 
decide to protect scholars against public records requests. First, it 
suggested that statutory exemptions might exist that would carve 
out safe havens for academics. New Jersey has both “scholarly 
records” and “intellectual property records” exemptions, for 
example, and the Issue Brief suggested that other states might be 
lobbied to adopt similar exemptions. Second, it suggested that a 
                                                
24 Amy Gajda, The First Amendment Bubble (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press 2009), pp. 145-155. 
25 Stephanie Paige Ogburn, “How to Cope When Activitists Ask for Climate Scientists’ 
Personal E-Mails,” Scientific American, January 21, 2014. 
26 Rachel Levinson-Waldman, “Academic Freedom and the Public’s Right to Know: How 
to Counter the Chilling Effect of FOIA on Scholarship,” American Constitution Society, 
September 2011. 
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balancing test should be used in making disclosure decisions that 
would require parties to demonstrate great need for public records, 
and deny access to parties who were merely interested in a 
particular subject. Third, it suggested that a scholar’s privilege 
might be enacted in order to ensure protection for professors and 
others. Finally, it suggested that academics should be exempt from 
the purview of freedom-of-information statutes because of the 
statutes’ seeming laser-sharp focus on government agency records, 
documents that are seemingly quite different from scholarship by 
individual academics. 
Despite recent information requests by E & E Legal for scholars’ 
records, two recent decisions show that some modern courts are 
tipping slightly in favor of at least some level of protection for 
scholars even though they are doing so in a way that fails to 
embrace academic freedom more generally.  
In New Jersey in 2012, in a case springing from the development 
of a shopping mall, the state supreme court decided that a law 
school environmental law clinic would not be subject to the state’s 
open records law. Law school clinics, the court decided, were in 
the business of teaching law students how to practice law and, 
therefore, did not conduct any official government business as 
defined by the statute. Moreover, the court decided, forced public 
disclosure would impact the way that students learn about the law, 
thereby impacting how the citizens of New Jersey are represented 
by public clinics. All that, to the court’s mind, seemed contrary to 
public policy. Nonetheless, the court viewed its decision was a 
narrow one; the protection offered for clinic records did not extend 
to those within the university or the law school, both of which, it 
suggested, were public agencies and, therefore, subject to open 
records laws.  
Second, in 2014, the Virginia Supreme Court decided that the 
state’s freedom-of-information law – one that excluded from the 
law higher education-related records of a “proprietary” nature – 
did not apply to certain public university records. There, the court 
focused on the legislature’s insistence that public universities not 
be put at a competitive disadvantage with private universities; it 
decided that such worry included more than simple financial 
disadvantage. “In the context of higher education efforts,” the 
court wrote, “damage to faculty recruitment and retention, 
undermining of faculty expectations of privacy and confidentiality, 
and impairment of free thought and expression” all contributed to 
putting public universities at a disadvantage with private 
institutions should public institutions be forced to reveal certain 
information through public records laws. There too, however, the 
court’s focus was decidedly on an exemption unique to the statute 
itself, rather than on more sweeping interests in academic freedom. 
Although both the New Jersey and the Virginia cases focused 
narrowly on the facts at hand, they suggest in a small way that 
courts may be more amenable to recognizing academic freedom 
more broadly today, specifically in privacy-related contexts. The 
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New Jersey case uses language that suggests that there is a 
difference between a university’s “government action” and a 
professor’s more limited interaction within that scholarly 
community,27 and the Virginia case literally uses the word privacy 
to decide that public universities would be disadvantaged by a 
sweeping interpretation of the public records statute.  
Today, then, it seems that the privacy implications of any public 
records statute could well help bolster any of the four arguments 
put forth by the American Constitution Society and others who 
wish to carve out exceptions from FOIA for academics. If 
interactions between those within a scholarly community should 
be protected because of the uniqueness of teaching and learning, 
as in the New Jersey case, and if outsiders’ inquiries might well 
quash full scholarly inquiry, as in the Virginia case, freedom of 
thought and self-fulfillment – and, therefore, privacy concerns – 
seem quite relevant to any public records request to an academic.  
Relatedly and importantly, outside of the academic context, privacy 
law scholars have made the connection between thought and 
privacy, and have recognized the dangers of revelation of 
educational inquiry. This is true especially with regard to electronic 
interactions between persons, key to any public records request for 
email communications or other proof of what scholars may be 
thinking as they work on research. “[C]onsider surveillance of 
people when they are thinking, reading, and communicating with 
others in order to make up their minds about political and social 
issues,” Neil Richards wrote in the Harvard Law Review in 2013.28 
Intellectual privacy, he argued, protects an individual’s intellectual 
freedom to think. 
Julie Cohen too has suggested outside of the higher education 
context that privacy is necessary for fuller thought and, therefore, 
self-determination: 
Privacy is shorthand for breathing room to engage in the 
processes of boundary management that enable and 
constitute self-development… In a world characterized by 
pervasive social shaping of subjectivity, privacy fosters 
(partial) self-determination. It enables individuals both to 
maintain relational ties and to develop critical perspectives 
on the world around them.29 
Consider, then, the material that would necessarily be revealed 
should a scholar be forced to purge documents, including internet 
communication and searches, through a public records request – 
and how such forced revelation would impact future thought and 
inquiry at that school and others. 
Within the context of police investigations, United States Supreme 
Court Justices, too, have written about the importance of privacy 
and freedom of thought, and have criticized technology that tracks 
                                                
27 “[N]ot even the University … controls the manner in which clinical professors … 
practice law.” Id. at 547. 
28 Neil M. Richards, “The Dangers of Surveillance,” 126 Harv. L. Rev. 1934 (2013). 
29 Julie Cohen, “What Privacy Is for,” 126 Harv. L. Rev. 1904 (2013). 
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and records such exploration. Justice Sotomayor, for example, 
writing in concurrence in a case involving GPS tracking, suggested 
that such surveillance had broader implications. Though she was 
concerned specifically about government surveillance, the same 
could well be said about outside eyes peering in on scholarly 
inquiry:  
Awareness that the Government may be watching chills 
associational and expressive freedoms… The net result is 
that GPS monitoring – by making available at a relatively 
low cost such a substantial quantum of intimate 
information about any person whom the Government, in 
its unfettered discretion, chooses to track – may “alter the 
relationship between citizen and government in a way that 
is inimical to democratic society.”30 
A year later, the entire Supreme Court agreed that police need a 
warrant before examining the content of cell phones – and did so 
in a way that suggested that there were interests beyond those that 
would be involved in a typical physical police search: “With all [that 
cell phones] contain and all they may reveal, they hold … ‘the 
privacies of life.’” “The fact that technology now allows an 
individual to carry such information in his hand does not make the 
information any less worthy of the protection for which the 
Founders fought.”31 The Justices appeared particularly concerned 
with the protection of computer-based information and the 
connection between thought and intellectual exploration: 
“[C]ertain types of data are also qualitatively different,” including 
Internet searches and browsing history that “could reveal an 
individual’s private interests or concerns.” They quoted Justice 
Sotomayor’s language of concurrence in the GPS case, that such 
monitoring “generates a precise, comprehensive record of a 
person’s public movements that reflects a wealth of detail about 
her familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual 
associations.” 
Judges then, even at the nation’s highest court, have lauded the 
importance of privacy in intellectual pursuits in a way that parallels 
academic interests. Key here is that they suggest that such 
exploration should be protected for constitutional reasons, 
including freedom of association and expression. Such language, of 
course, is highly reflective of the Court’s jurisprudence regarding 
academic freedom and the First Amendment. 
At a time, then, when there are promises for an increasing number 
of public records requests made to academics, a focus on the 
importance of privacy and its protective relation to freedom of 
thought provides a strong response. Many earlier cases that 
rejected such protection came at a pre-internet time when 
intellectual privacy did not seem as pressing a need as it does in 
                                                
30 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). 
31 Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014). 
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today’s decidedly more technologically-driven, easy-to-track-
inquiry world. 
CONCLUSION 
In 2010, the Texas legislature passed a law that forces faculty 
members at public institutions to publish certain information on 
the internet, including class syllabi and their curricula vitae. 
Officials maintained that such revelations were important for 
consumer protection. Professors argued in response that such 
forced publication impacted their academic freedom; outsiders 
would now scrutinize classroom teaching and particular professors’ 
research interests, potentially quashing some scholarly inquiry.  
The American Association of University Professors suggested that 
the law is a hybrid of “seemingly good intentions and bad ones,” 
noting the conflict between public records laws and academic 
pursuits. The latter should not be quashed in pursuit of the former, 
it argued.  
This clash between openness in government and academic 
freedom interests exists today each time a FOIA request is made 
for a professor’s emails or other research-related records. A more 
explicit focus on privacy and its important connection to 
intellectual thought could well help prevent further erosion of 
academic freedom. Such a focus seems very much in line with 
concerns that have been expressed at the nation’s highest court for 
more than half a century, from the time it first recognized the 
importance of academic freedom through its privacy-related 
concerns about intellectual freedom more generally today. 
